Former NASA Director Shares Leadership Lessons From Catastrophic Spaceflight Disasters

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Photo Courtesy of Paul Sean Hill

Paul Sean Hill

According to its stated mission, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), is responsible for unique scientific and technological achievements in human space flight, aeronautics, space science, and space applications that have had widespread impacts on our nation and the world. Developed in response to early Soviet space achievements, NASA was built on the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA), and other government organizations, as the center of U. S. civil aerospace research and development. When NASA opened on October 1, 1958, it accelerated the work already started on human and robotic space flight.

Undoubtedly, there have been many groundbreaking achievements throughout its history, including the six manned Moon landings, to satellites which explored other planets, to the Hubble Space Telescope, Shuttle, and leading the construction of the International Space Station. But, according to Former NASA Director of Mission Operations, Paul Sean Hill, there were fatal errors in leadership and management that contributed to the three catastrophic spaceflight disasters: Apollo 1 (January 27, 1967), the Space Shuttle Challenger (January 28, 1986), and Space Shuttle Columbia (February 1, 2003).

Hill shares below his experience and perspective of the critical leadership lessons learned from these spaceflight disasters. Hill served as NASA Director of Mission Operations from 2007-2014, and is the Founder of Atlas Executive Consulting and author of Leadership Mission Control Room to Boardroom. He is a former U.S. Air Force Captain, holds a master’s degree in Aerospace Engineering, and was awarded the coveted Presidential Rank Award of Meritorious Executive by the United States Office of Personnel Management.

Kathy Caprino: Paul, you say failures in leadership were key contributors to each of the three NASA spaceflight accidents, but physical engineering mistakes played a big part, no?

Paul Sean Hill: Each of NASA’s catastrophic human spaceflight accidents did have a physical engineering cause. In each case the underlying cause for the engineering mistake was a pervasive tendency in the community to ignore or trivialize indicators of problems while racing towards an important objective. This tendency was brought on by senior leaders who were highly respected and very accomplished in both the detailed engineering required to fly in space as well as in senior management.

Their intentions were good, and, like the workforce, they considered their first priority to be to protect the astronauts. And yet, the environment they created through their management practices led the community to gradually ignore warning signs and accept risks with less and less rigor, and seventeen astronauts died as a result of leadership failings not faulty engineering.

Caprino: Please tell us more about these missions and the fatal errors.

Hill: They are:

Apollo 1

During a test on the launch pad on January 27, 1967, the Apollo 1 astronauts died as a result of a flash fire that was caused by the 100% oxygen atmosphere inside the capsule. Although there were several design and manufacturing related contributors to the ignition source of the fire, famous Flight Director Gene Kranz said it best to Mission Control after the accident, “We were too gung-ho about the schedule, and we locked out all of the problems we saw each day in our work. Every element of the program was in trouble, and so were we.  The simulators were not working, Mission Control was behind in virtually every area, and the flight and test procedures changed daily.  Nothing we did had any shelf life.  Not one of us stood up and said, ‘Dammit, stop!’”

Challenger

Nineteen years later, on January 28, 1986, the Space Shuttle Challenger astronauts died during launch, when one of the solid rocket boosters leaked a jet of hot gas that burned through the external tank causing it to explode. The engineering cause was a seal on the solid rocket booster that did not perform correctly because of the freezing weather. While accurate, it does not explain the real tragedy: for weeks, the solid rocket booster manufacturer had warned a team of NASA engineers and an executive that the seal was at great risk of leaking due to the cold temperatures. Rather than stand down to study the problem, the NASA executive challenged the manufacturer, “My God, Thiokol, when do you want me to launch—next April?”

Columbia

Seventeen years after Challenger, on February 1, 2003, seven astronauts died when Space Shuttle Columbia disintegrated 40 miles above Texas at 10,000 mph while on their way to land in Florida. A piece of foam insulation from the external tank had broken off and struck the left wing two weeks earlier during launch. The resulting damage allowed the fireball that normally flows around the wing to enter and fatally damage the wing.  Before the launch, NASA had been studying a number of concerns with Shuttle systems that posed obvious and serious risks, one of which was not this foam insulation. Sadly, NASA had been aware for years that small pieces of foam had been tearing away from the external tank, but we did not perform any rigorous engineering analysis or testing to determine if this foam posed a threat to the Shuttle.

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Part of the series “Today’s True Leadership”

Photo Courtesy of Paul Sean Hill

Paul Sean Hill

According to its stated mission, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), is responsible for unique scientific and technological achievements in human space flight, aeronautics, space science, and space applications that have had widespread impacts on our nation and the world. Developed in response to early Soviet space achievements, NASA was built on the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA), and other government organizations, as the center of U. S. civil aerospace research and development. When NASA opened on October 1, 1958, it accelerated the work already started on human and robotic space flight.

Undoubtedly, there have been many groundbreaking achievements throughout its history, including the six manned Moon landings, to satellites which explored other planets, to the Hubble Space Telescope, Shuttle, and leading the construction of the International Space Station. But, according to Former NASA Director of Mission Operations, Paul Sean Hill, there were fatal errors in leadership and management that contributed to the three catastrophic spaceflight disasters: Apollo 1 (January 27, 1967), the Space Shuttle Challenger (January 28, 1986), and Space Shuttle Columbia (February 1, 2003).

Hill shares below his experience and perspective of the critical leadership lessons learned from these spaceflight disasters. Hill served as NASA Director of Mission Operations from 2007-2014, and is the Founder of Atlas Executive Consulting and author of Leadership Mission Control Room to Boardroom. He is a former U.S. Air Force Captain, holds a master’s degree in Aerospace Engineering, and was awarded the coveted Presidential Rank Award of Meritorious Executive by the United States Office of Personnel Management.

Kathy Caprino: Paul, you say failures in leadership were key contributors to each of the three NASA spaceflight accidents, but physical engineering mistakes played a big part, no?

Paul Sean Hill: Each of NASA’s catastrophic human spaceflight accidents did have a physical engineering cause. In each case the underlying cause for the engineering mistake was a pervasive tendency in the community to ignore or trivialize indicators of problems while racing towards an important objective. This tendency was brought on by senior leaders who were highly respected and very accomplished in both the detailed engineering required to fly in space as well as in senior management.

Their intentions were good, and, like the workforce, they considered their first priority to be to protect the astronauts. And yet, the environment they created through their management practices led the community to gradually ignore warning signs and accept risks with less and less rigor, and seventeen astronauts died as a result of leadership failings not faulty engineering.

Caprino: Please tell us more about these missions and the fatal errors.

Hill: They are:

Apollo 1

During a test on the launch pad on January 27, 1967, the Apollo 1 astronauts died as a result of a flash fire that was caused by the 100% oxygen atmosphere inside the capsule. Although there were several design and manufacturing related contributors to the ignition source of the fire, famous Flight Director Gene Kranz said it best to Mission Control after the accident, “We were too gung-ho about the schedule, and we locked out all of the problems we saw each day in our work. Every element of the program was in trouble, and so were we.  The simulators were not working, Mission Control was behind in virtually every area, and the flight and test procedures changed daily.  Nothing we did had any shelf life.  Not one of us stood up and said, ‘Dammit, stop!’”

Challenger

Nineteen years later, on January 28, 1986, the Space Shuttle Challenger astronauts died during launch, when one of the solid rocket boosters leaked a jet of hot gas that burned through the external tank causing it to explode. The engineering cause was a seal on the solid rocket booster that did not perform correctly because of the freezing weather. While accurate, it does not explain the real tragedy: for weeks, the solid rocket booster manufacturer had warned a team of NASA engineers and an executive that the seal was at great risk of leaking due to the cold temperatures. Rather than stand down to study the problem, the NASA executive challenged the manufacturer, “My God, Thiokol, when do you want me to launch—next April?”

Columbia

Seventeen years after Challenger, on February 1, 2003, seven astronauts died when Space Shuttle Columbia disintegrated 40 miles above Texas at 10,000 mph while on their way to land in Florida. A piece of foam insulation from the external tank had broken off and struck the left wing two weeks earlier during launch. The resulting damage allowed the fireball that normally flows around the wing to enter and fatally damage the wing.  Before the launch, NASA had been studying a number of concerns with Shuttle systems that posed obvious and serious risks, one of which was not this foam insulation. Sadly, NASA had been aware for years that small pieces of foam had been tearing away from the external tank, but we did not perform any rigorous engineering analysis or testing to determine if this foam posed a threat to the Shuttle.

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