The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has launched an epic quest to build the biggest rocket ever constructed, with the aim of taking astronauts deeper into space than ever before. Called the Space Launch System, it will eventually provide the means for carrying human beings to Mars.
Much of the needed technology will be adapted from equipment used on the Space Shuttle to save money. However, the core stages that will provide most of the rocket's lift had to be developed from scratch. Boeing, a contributor to my think tank, won the contract to build the stages in 2012. Recognizing the technological and managerial challenges involved, NASA has consistently rated Boeing's performance on the program as "excellent" or "very good."
Nonetheless, on October 10 NASA's Inspector General released an audit deriding Boeing's performance. It states that "cost increases and schedule delays of Core Stage development can be traced largely to management, technical, and infrastructure issues driven by Boeing's poor performance."
I have read the audit through twice and talked to Boeing executives about its findings. It appears to be a political document engineered by a holdover appointee from the Obama administration -- the same administration that tried to kill all of NASA's human exploration programs. It omits important information, misstates key facts and isn't even internally consistent in its assertions.
The Space Launch System will evolve over time while continuing to use the core stages that Boeing is developing. The plan to continue producing and evolving the launch vehicle was one of the many complexities ignored in the Inspector General's audit.Wikimedia
For instance, it seeks to blame Boeing for delays on the program, but then provides a compendium of factors contributing to the delays such as tornadoes and tooling malfunctions that cannot reasonably be attributed to mismanagement. Auditors also seem to have made almost no effort to obtain the contractor's explanation of why problems occurred; as a result, there are major inaccuracies.
If the Space Launch System is an epic quest, the Inspector General's latest assessment of its progress is an epic fail. What follows is a list of the top eight deficiencies I detect in the audit. My list is not exhaustive. But it is instructive.
First, the audit fails to provide historical context that might help explain why problems have occurred. This is only the second time in history that any country has tried to develop such a powerful rocket. The first time was the Saturn V program for Apollo missions to the Moon, half a century ago. With the demise of the Space Shuttle program, key skills were lost, infrastructure aged and the supply chain atrophied. NASA understood there were major challenges ahead, but the Inspector General is mum on their impact.
Second, the audit fails to recognize the disruptive impact of Obama-era decisions concerning NASA's human exploration program. After canceling those exploration efforts, the Obama administration first opposed and then impeded development of the Space Launch System, even though it had been directed by Congress. In 2015, the first full year of rocket development, funding for the program was cut 25%, resulting in the loss of 400 workers. The audit mentions this issue, but only to minimize its significance.
Third, the audit fails to acknowledge how a sub-optimal funding profile contributed to difficulties. Unlike major space exploration efforts of the past, there was no surge in NASA's budget during the initial years of the Space Launch System program. Because almost all of the data in the audit is derived from these early years, it provides a poor basis for projecting performance during the Trump administration. In fact, program performance has improved markedly since Trump took office.
Fourth, the audit fails to accurately calculate the current or future mix of program costs. For instance, it states that Boeing's core stages contract is over 40% of the Space Launch System cost through 2021 when in fact it is about 35%. It assumes continued outlays for items that have already been fully purchased. It ignores contractor estimates of future costs that are $2 billion below its own projections -- even though the contractor estimates are based on more recent data.
Fifth, the audit fails to mention corrective actions taken to resolve early problems in the program. Some of those actions were taken years ago, and reflected the learning that occurs in all development programs. Other actions eliminated costs no longer deemed necessary or refined managerial practices. Collectively, such corrective actions have altered the cost vector of the program, but none of that is acknowledged in the audit. It assumes past is prologue despite recent gains in performance.
Sixth, the audit fails to note the difficulties associated with rebuilding NASA's workforce and skill base. The development and fabrication of equipment for human spaceflight is extremely demanding. When investment wanes, so do the necessary skills. Boeing has had to rebuild all that, and meanwhile implement new technologies that were not available when Saturn V and the Space Shuttle were developed. No planning tool could have anticipated all the issues that might arise, but it is a one-time process that is now largely accomplished.
Seventh, the audit fails to reflect relevant information about the Space Launch System program that was readily available from the lead contractor. Contractors working on technology programs typically have a better understanding of their intricacies than anybody else. But during the five months it took the Inspector General's staff to complete this latest audit, it consulted with Boeing for a grand total of three hours. The company says there are mistakes in the audit they could easily have corrected if anyone asked.
Eighth, the audit fails to acknowledge any of the progress that has been made in the program. There have been major successes in revitalizing the human spaceflight industrial base and fabricating the first core stage stack for testing. The progress matters in an audit since it bears upon the cost curve that the program will likely follow in the future. Because none of this progress is reflected in the audit's data or narrative, it comes to much more pessimistic conclusions about future costs than current program trends warrant.
I could go on but this is a blog, not the Encyclopedia Galactica. The point here is that NASA's Inspector General has put together an almost entirely negative assessment of a program that is making steady progress and is unique in the world. The audit is backward looking not only in terms of its facts, but -- dare I say -- its biases. The Obama administration was never serious about returning to the Moon and then going on to Mars. The Trump administration has embraced those goals, and the Space Launch System is the best ticket we have for getting there.
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